It is conventional wisdom from President Barack Obama 1 down that there is a medical malpractice crisis. 2 Physicians have substantial trouble finding affordable professional liability insurance, especially in states with litigation environments that favor plaintiffs' attorneys. 3 Reformers argue that malpractice liability does a poor job of distinguishing between good doctors and bad doctors. 4 Plaintiffs' lawyers and other opponents of reform disagree, arguing that the contingent fee system deters lawyers from bringing lowmerit suits.
5
Reformers maintain that the random and capricious nature of malpractice liability prevents insurers from using claim histories to "experience rate" most physicians, 6 and that high insurance rates therefore deter medical practice, rather than malpractice. 7 This problem is exacerbated in their view by the misuse of litigation techniques to push scientifically questionable theories of liability, 8 and by the expense of unfettered noneconomic damages, which are inherently arbitrary and unpredictable, 9 and which present a moral hazard risk of ex post exaggeration of injuries by plaintiffs.
10 Doctors' organizations and tort reform groups have called for caps on noneconomic damages in patients than the sued negligent doctors; majority of patients receiving compensation weren't injured by negligence); Robert Caplan and Karen Posner, The expert witness: Insights from the Closed Claims Project, 61(6) ASA NEWSLETTER 9 (1997) (expert witness testimony affected by outcome bias); Robert Caplan et al., Effect of outcome on physician judgments of appropriateness of care, 265 JAMA 1957 (1991) (same). medical malpractice cases, which have been shown to reduce insurance costs; 11 many states have adopted such measures. 12 A group of five scholars, performing empirical research using closed claim data from Texas, 13 have written a series of papers that often challenge the conventional wisdom.
14 Four of these papers in particular-Hyman et al., 15 Zeiler et al. 16 and Silver et al., 17 and Hyman, et al. 18 ("the Texas studies") are the first to study the effect of insurance limits on medical malpractice litigation. Silver et al. proposes that insurance limits act as a "de facto cap on malpractice damages," 19 and notes that many plaintiffs settling for insurance 11 Mello, supra note 2 at ___. 15 Haircuts, supra note __. 16 Zeiler, supra note __. 19 Id. at 188.
limits are being undercompensated. 20 Silver et al. concludes that "if policy limits essentially cap amounts collectible by claimants, statutory caps set above prevailing limits will have less impact on payments and premiums than one might predict." 21 In a series of blog posts, Silver goes farther and argues that the putative de facto cap makes the debate over damages caps irrelevant. 22 But while a disproportionate number of settlements are indeed at or near policy limits, 23 a substantial number of settlements are made above policy limits, and, in the Texas studies' dataset, forty-seven percent of cases in which plaintiffs obtain verdicts above policy limits are settled after trial for amounts that are also above policy limits, while another twenty percent settle below policy limits, suggesting the likelihood of a strong appeal, rather than at limits, which would be more consistent with the hypothesis advanced by Silver, et al. that such post-verdict haircuts almost always reflect collectability concerns. 24 We build on the analysis of the Texas studies by considering more fully the effect of collateral litigation over an insurer's failure to settle a case before trial. Under Texas law, a plaintiff who makes a settlement offer at or below settlement limits that is rejected has a potential cause of action against an insurer for the full amount of a judgment above policy limits for bad-faith refusal to settle. 25 Punitive damages are possible. 26 This is known in Texas as a Stowers action.
27
The Stowers issue is not unique to Texas. A Tampa-area hospital emergency room failed to diagnose Allan Navarro's stroke after two negative CT-scans failed to show any 20 Id.; accord Zeiler, supra note __ at s41. 21 Silver, supra note __ at 188. 22 Charles Silver, Tort Deform blog, "How Much Malpractice Coverage Does Your Doctor Have?", http://www.tortdeform.com/archives/2007/05/how_much_malpractice_coverage.html (May 23, 2007) ("If people in our society focused on things that mattered, the debate over damages caps would end immediately. We already have them."). 23 Zeiler, supra note __ at __. 24 Haircuts, supra note __ at 42. problem. 28 With 20/20 hindsight, 29 a jury awarded $217 million in damages. 30 The plaintiff's lawyer, Steve Yerrid, promised to sue the insurance company, which, apparently thinking the case meritless despite the seriousness of the outcome, had offered only three hundred dollars in settlement. 31 Florida, like Texas, has a closed claim database, and one of us retrieved the record of the closed claim in Navarro's case: the insurer settled the case after trial for $4,766,781, well over the three-million-dollar policy limits. 32 Similarly, when a Stamford, Connecticut, jury awarded $38.5 million to the family of a boy born with cerebral palsy, Professor Baker acknowledged to the press that the possibility of a bad-faith lawsuit against the insurer that refused a insurance-limit settlement offer would likely result in a post-trial settlement of the original case for an amount above the insurance limits. Bad-faith insurance litigation obviously has a substantial effect on pre-trial negotiations and settlements in malpractice cases across the country, yet no paper has explored that effect and its implications for proposals for legal reform. 36 Silver, supra note _ at 188; Zeiler, supra note _ at s31 n. 32 and s41; Haircuts, supra note _ at 55. 37 Haircuts, supra note _ at 55. Others have noted this tactic. E.g., Syervud, supra note __ at 1169-70 & n. 146 (noting that plaintiffs "attempt to 'set-up' insurers for excess liability claims under current duty-to-settle law" by making settlement offers within policy limits and citing cases); Russell G. Thornton Part III presents a game theory model of litigation and settlement of medical malpractice cases. We show that by varying the model to include the possibility of Stowers litigation, incentives are changed to substantially increase the likelihood that settlement offers will be made and accepted at insurance policy limits. Using a Monte Carlo simulation of thousands of malpractice cases, we also show that Stowers increases the expected return of plaintiffs in malpractice litigation, and that plaintiffs with low-merit cases are systematically overcompensated. Finally, we show that, given Stowers and insurance limits, the effect of noneconomic damages caps on settlements falls almost entirely on the low-merit cases, and that plaintiffs in those cases remain overcompensated even when caps are in place.
Part IV analyzes the public-policy implications of the Frank-Gryphon game-theory model and suggests further refinements to be pursued in future research.
I. The Cause of Action for Failure to Settle
Imagine a scenario in which a defendant has an insurance policy with a $1 million limit, and a plaintiff brings a suit against the defendant with a 90% chance of recovering $3 million. If the insurer has full control over the case, the excess liability will give it a conflict of interest with the insured defendant. If, as the jury is deliberating, the plaintiff offers to settle the case for $1 million, the insurer has the incentive to refuse the offer (because of the 10% chance that it will not have to pay any damages), while the defendant would want the insurer to accept the offer (because of the 90% chance that she will be liable for the excess $2 million).
38
Because of this conflict of interest, the law has for nearly a century 39 imposed on insurers a "duty to settle" the cases of insured defendants within policy limits. 40 The scope of this duty varies from state to state. In some states, the duty is merely one of good-faith evaluation of the settlement offer with due care. In others, there is an affirmative duty to settle claims where there is a likelihood of excess liability: the duty is considered a fiduciary duty, and the legal effect is very much like strict liability. 41 Texas requires insurers to settle whenever the terms of a plaintiff's demand within policy limits "are 38 For an expanded analysis of this dynamic, see Syervud, supra note __ at 1127-30. 39 Syervud, supra note __ at 1116 n. 4 (tracing duty to settle in United States back to [1914] [1915] [1916] . 40 Id. at 1126 ("Courts entertain the duty-to-settle claim because they believe that insurance companies will at times abuse their power over settlement by inappropriately refusing a demand and thereby exposing their insureds to liability in excess of the policy limits.").
such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it, considering the likelihood and degree of the insured's potential exposure to an excess judgment." 42 The legal duty to settle, in theory, better aligns the insurer's interests with those of the insured, and some states express the duty in terms of the carrier being required to evaluate a settlement demand as if its own liability were unlimited. 43 Breach of the duty to settle is sometimes framed as "bad faith," which is technically a misnomer because liability does not anywhere require a showing of malice or recklessness. 44 The breach of the duty to settle can result in the insurer being liable not just for the excess liability in the underlying malpractice case, 45 but also for non-economic and punitive damages. 46 Slusher and Ospital never executed on their judgment against Campbell; instead they settled with him for a share of and control of Campbell's "bad faith" lawsuit against State Farm.
56 Though Campbell presented no evidence of physical or emotional distress, 57 a jury awarded $2.6 million in "compensatory" damages, and another $145 million in punitive damages. 58 Compensatory damages were reduced to $1 million by the trial judge, 59 and, after the Supreme Court held the $145 million punitive award unconstitutional, 60 the Utah Supreme Court, finding State Farm's behavior to be "reprehensible," reduced it to a 9:1 ratio of $9 million, 61 and the U.S. Supreme Court refused further review. In conjunction with other awards and liability for attorneys' fees, State Farm was eventually held liable for $11 million over its refusal to settle a case that resulted in an excess judgment of only $135,000.
62
Regardless of the legal standard articulated by courts in duty-to-settle cases, juries tend to apply a de facto standard of strict liability due to the well-documented psychological phenomenon of hindsight bias. 63 (1993) ("The insurance company should also remember that, if it loses on its gamble and is faced with a suit for failure to settle, its decision will be 'second guessed' by a jury with the benefit of hindsight."); Sykes, supra note __ at 1373 (warning of drift to strict liability standard).
refusal to settle should be examined in the context of the facts known to it at the time.
64
But in practice, juries sometimes impose excess liability unexpectedly in relatively lowmerit cases. When that happens, juries in subsequent breach-of-duty-to-settle suits systematically overestimate the ex ante likelihood of an over-limits verdict in the underlying case, often imposing noneconomic and punitive damages on an insurer that could not, in fact, have reasonably foreseen the unlikely trial outcome when it engaged in pre-trial settlement negotiations. An "honest judgment that the insured is not liable when facing a claimant with substantial damages may be insufficient to negate subsequent liability for failure to settle."
65
Even academic commentators underestimate the effect that hindsight bias has on the expected outcomes of lawsuits alleging a breach of the duty to settle. Indeed, one of the co-authors of the Texas studies wrote a law review article arguing that allegations of a breach of the duty to settle should be permitted to reach a jury whenever the "maximum possible judgment" was greater than policy limits 66 -which effectively means every time a judgment is issued greater than policy limits, 67 as well as an occasional case in which the defendant wins at trial against someone who claims severe injuries.
An insurer therefore must seriously consider an offer to settle any tort lawsuit at or below policy limits before trial due to the high potential cost of a Stowers action. Even if the expected value of the underlying case is below the insurer's policy limits, a small chance that a jury will return an over-limit verdict can generate an expected Stowers liability that outstrips the value of the underlying case. An observer who examines an insurer's riskneutral settlement decision without considering the effect of the Stowers mechanic on the insurer's wealth-maximization curve would be surprised to see results that look as though the insurer is extraordinarily risk-averse. And some courts have suggested that insurers should adopt the risk-aversion of their insureds in fulfilling their duty to settle, which should exaggerate this effect further. 68 An observer who fails to consider the effect of expected Stowers punitive and excess damages, and who assumes risk-neutrality on behalf of insurers when evaluating tort settlements, will also overestimate the legal merits of the underlying claims that those insurers settle before trial. It is a mistake to assume that a settlement demand and acceptance at the amount of an insured's policy limits necessarily reflects the parties' belief that the expected value of an underlying malpractice case is greater than or equal to those limits.
Return to the hypothetical at the beginning of this section, but assume instead that the plaintiff has a 25% chance of success of proving liability on $3 million in damages rather than a 90% chance of success. If the plaintiff makes a settlement demand of the $1 million policy limits under these circumstances, her offer will be materially higher than the $750,000 expected value of the case. But there is still a conflict of interest between the defendant and the insurer: a risk-averse defendant will wish for the insurer to accept the offer: the settlement creates a 100% chance that she will face no liability versus a 25% chance of $2 million excess liability if the case goes to trial. If the risk and size of Stowers liability is large enough, a risk-neutral insurer may engage in behavior that, absent Stowers, appears to be risk-averse and agree to the $1 million settlement demand.
Thus a settlement at policy limits may indicate that a plaintiff has been forced to artificially compromise a strong claim due to the uncertainty of collecting an excess judgment, but it may just as easily indicate that a plaintiff with a lower-value claim has nonetheless obtained a settlement at policy limits because of the insurer's wish to avoid the possibility of a Stowers suit. The quantitative data on settlements in Texas therefore cannot reveal the objective qualitative value of a medical malpractice case because of the confounding factor of Stowers liability. That a malpractice plaintiff settles at policy limits does not necessarily mean that her claim is worth more than policy limits; it easily may be worth less.
Finally, Texas and other states refuse to impose a duty to settle on an insurer when a settlement demand is made above the insurance policy limits. 69 There is therefore a feedback effect: the amount of the settlement demand will affect the expected value of the case. As Figure 1 below shows, this effect results in a discontinuity in the function expressing the expected value of the case, ceteris paribus, as the settlement demand increases:
Figure 1
Figures 1 and 2 are inspired by Chandler. For simplicity's sake, they measure wealth rather than utility and reflect risk-neutral parties, but neither simplification affects the analysis that follows. With the help of Stowers or other bad-faith opportunities, many cases will settle at insurance limits because the plaintiff will not offer less than limits, while the insurer will not, pre-trial, offer to pay more than limits. In the absence of a bad faith cause of action for failure to settle within policy limits, the plaintiff would choose trial for all settlement amounts up to the expected value of trial, and will choose settlement for all higher amounts. With the addition of an option to pursue (an assigned or original) bad-faith claim, however, the plaintiff may make other choices, depending on the value of the bad-faith claim at any given settlement amount, which will be a function of the probability of success at trial, the settlement offer, and the policy limits.
Figure 1 thus shows that for some parameter values, the introduction of bad faith will cause the plaintiff to refuse to settle for any amount below policy limits, even if the offered amount exceeds the expected value of the underlying case. Figure 2 shows, conversely, that within the same parameters, insurers will be willing to pay no more than settlement limits pre-trial; the lack of bad-faith liability when the settlement offer is more than policy limits will cause insurers to choose to go to trial rather than settle if the plaintiff demands more than settlement limits pre-trial:
Figure 2
Many cases will land in the discontinuity and thus settle for insurance limits. In fact, every case for which the following inequality holds should settle exactly at limits: EV Trial + EV Stowers Claim > Policy Limits > EV Trial. We would therefore expect to see a disproportionate number of cases settle for settlement limits, even if none of the underlying cases have an expected value greater than settlement limits. If the defendant's assets are sufficiently small or otherwise protected by law, the settlement demand at insurance limits might well reflect the global maxima for expected wealth-maximization for a plaintiff.
II. Previous Literature
Kent D. Syverud's 1990 article, The Duty to Settle, added a new dimension to the policy debate surrounding bad faith liability by observing that tort litigation and the liability insurance industry have a symbiotic relationship. Not only do changing conditions in the legal arena affect the kind and amount of liability insurance that potential defendants purchase, products and prevailing practices in the liability insurance market in turn affect which suits are brought and whether (and for how much) they settle.
70
Syverud highlights several sources of possible conflicts of interest between liability insurers and their insureds. First and most famously, liability limits may create conflicts between the insurer and insured because the presence of limits may incentivize insurers to litigate cases that their insured defendants would prefer to settle. 71 Second, conflicts may arise due to the customary allocation of defense costs to the insurer rather than the insured, which may motivate the insurer to quickly settle cases that the defendant would prefer to litigate. 72 Third, Syverud cites differences in risk aversion between insurers and their insureds.
73 Although such differences are what make insurance a viable industry, they may sometimes lead risk-neutral insurers to litigate cases that the insured would rather settle. 74 Fourth, Syverud points to the insurers interest in strategic bargaining as a possible source of conflict of interest. 75 Finally, Syverud discusses conflicts that may arise because the insurer or insured have additional stakes in the outcome of the case, such as reputational concerns.
76
Syverud observes that not all conflicts involve an insurer that has less interest in settling a claim than does its insured, and yet a "duty to settle" doctrine addresses only the subset of conflicts that take this form. In cases in which an insured faces a large deductable or, as in the case of professional malpractice suits, reputational costs associated with any settlement, or in cases that would be expensive for the insurer to defend at trial, the insured may actually prefer to try a case that the insurer wishes to settle. Nonetheless, there is no judicially-created "duty to litigate" doctrine to prevent the insurer from settling the cases over which it has contractual control, and Syverud reasons that this may be true in part because a duty to litigate would run counter to the general judicial policy of minimizing overcrowded dockets by promoting settlement whenever possible.
77
Syverud acknowledges that a duty to settle will ameliorate some conflicts between insurers and insureds, but argues that current doctrines, based on unclear standards 70 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1114-5. 71 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1127-39. 72 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1139-45. 73 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1145. 74 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1146. 75 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1149-57. 76 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1158-62. 77 Syverud, supra note ___ at ______. described variously as "negligence," "bad faith," or failure to "give equal consideration" to an insured's interest in settlement, are costly. 78 The costs of current duty to settle doctrines include not only the direct costs of litigating bad faith claims, but also the cost of documenting the process of claims adjustment and settlement in anticipation of a possible bad faith suit.
79
To avoid the cost of over-documenting the settlement process while preserving the benefits of a duty to settle, Syverud proposes a modified form of strict liability according to which an insurer that turns down a settlement offer within the insured's coverage limit will be automatically liable for any excess judgment unless the insurer offered to settle the suit for an amount set by a neutral arbiter such as a mediator or settlement judge. 80 He observes that such neutral valuations routinely take place in many jurisdictions due to court rules that require pre-trial dispute resolution efforts.
81
In a 1991 comment on Syverud's article, Charles Silver objected to Syverud's apparent claim that policy limits created no conflict of interest in cases in which the expected value of a claim at trial is within those limits. 82 Silver pointed out that, even in such cases, a methodical insurer will be willing to pay less in settlement than the expected value of the claim as long as the largest possible judgment in the case exceeds the policy limits because the insurer, in calculating it's own expected value of going to trial, will truncate the values of possible verdicts on the right tail (the high end) of the distribution of possible trial judgments, while a unitary defendant would not. 83 For this reason, Silver argued, bad faith failure-to-settle cases should reach a jury as long as the largest possible judgment foreseeable by the insurer at the time that a settlement offer is tendered and refused exceeds the limits of its policy. 84 Syverud accepted as a helpful clarification Silver's argument that the presence of insurance limits may give rise to conflicts of interest even in cases in which the expected judgment does not exceed those limits. However, he argued that Silver would allow virtually any bad faith claim to get to a jury because plaintiffs attorneys easily can 78 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1163-8. 79 Ibid. 80 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1168-71. 81 Syverud, supra note ___ at 1170-1. 82 Charles Silver, A Missed Misalignment of Interests: A Comment on Syverud, the Duty to Settle, 77 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1585 (1991). 83 Silver, A Missed Misalignment, supra note ___ at 1592-3. 84 Silver, A Missed Misalignment, supra note ___ at 1594. manipulate the amount of the maximum possible verdict when they draft complaints. 85 In the end, Silver stated that he was "attracted" to Syverud's proposal of a strict liability duty that applies only in cases in which the insurer declines to offer an amount set by a neutral arbiter, 86 due in part to the systematic tendency of juries to exaggerate the ability of insurers to correctly predict the outcome of a case. 87 Seth J. Chandler contributed a rigorous article examining the economic consequences of the duty to settle in 1993. 88 His article developed a three-player game between a Tortfeasor, and Insurer, and a Victim in order to explore the effects of a legal duty to settle on the outcome of the underlying tort claim, on the degree to which victims are compensated for their injuries and on the price of liability insurance. 89 Chandler presented four findings based on his model. First, a duty to settle increases the rate at which cases are settled rather than tried. 90 Second, a duty to settle will, on balance, increase the amount for which cases settle, with the result that especially generous remedies for breach of this duty will occasionally lead to overcompensation of plaintiffs. 91 Third, a duty to settle will result in higher liability insurance premiums.
92
Fourth, a duty to settle is likely to reduce the care that potential Tortfeasors (physicians, in the medical malpractice context) take to avoid injuring potential Victims, especially if the remedies for breach of the duty to settle are generous.
93
Chandler describes an initial settlement game that can lead to any of four subgames depending on which, if any, party rejects the last offer made by any player. 94 The "bad faith subgame" is reached only if the Insurer declines a settlement offer approved by both Tortfeasor and Victim, and in Chandler's simplified model, the Victim's payoffs (and therefore his ex ante incentives during the settlement game) are never affected by the 85 87 Silver, A Missed Misalignment, supra note ___ at n. 13. 88 See Chandler, supra note ___. 89 Chandler, supra note ___ at 742-3. 90 Chandler, supra note ___ at 744. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Chandler, supra note ___ at 752-755. outcome of the bad faith subgame. 95 Chandler acknowledged that knowledgeable readers might be "troubled" by his failure to incorporate the possibility that the Tortfeasor and Victim would agree, as they did in Campbell v. State Farm, 96 to assign the bad faith cause of action to the Victim in a post-trial settlement. 97 He observes that such claim assignments occur "quite frequently." 98 Chandler also fails to consider how the availability of a Stowers action would affect the payoffs of a Victim in his version of the bad faith subgame. Chandler points out, however, that this omission does not undermine any of his four findings and in fact bolsters his argument that the availability of generous remedies for breach of the duty to settle will reduce the incentives of the potential Tortfeasors to meet the legal standard of care. 99 Nonetheless, the limitations of Chandler's model prevented him from considering the possibility that an assigned claim or Stowers action might affect the minimum amount that the Victim would be willing to accept in a pre-trial settlement.
Alan O. Sykes considered several ways in which the duty to settle could affect a plaintiff's bargaining power in a 1994 article. 100 First, a duty to settle may increase the percentage of any judgment that is collectable by the plaintiff if the defendant would otherwise be bankrupted by an over-limit verdict.
101 If the expected value of going to trial thereby goes up, then the plaintiff will demand more money in settlement. Second, the availability of punitive or noneconomic damages for breach of the duty to settle can increase the plaintiff's bargaining power by driving up the defendant's expected cost of going to trial.
102 This is true even if there is no Stowers liability and the plaintiff's maximum trial payoff is equal to what it would be in the absence of a duty to settle. Finally, in some kinds of cases the duty to settle might induce a defendant to engage in costly settlement negotiations that it would otherwise find it economical to avoid.
103
While Sykes thus argues that the insurer's duty to settle may increase a plaintiff's bargaining power in certain subsets of cases, he does not consider the possibility of a 95 Chandler, supra note ___ at 757-8. 96 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 413-14. 97 Chandler, supra note ___ at n. 46. 98 Chandler, supra note ___ at n. 46. 99 Chandler, supra note ___ at n. 46. 101 Sykes, supra note ___ at 1367-8. 102 Sykes, supra note ___ at 1368. 103 Sykes, supra note ___ at 1368-9.
Stowers action in his analysis, nor does he explicitly discuss the possibility that an insured's bad faith cause of action could be assigned to a successful plaintiff, thus raising the minimum amount that she would accept in pre-trial settlement.
Neil Vidmar et al., using Florida data, looked at post-verdict and pre-suit settlements, but did not acknowledge the issue of bad-faith insurance litigation. 104 David A. Hyman, et al., performed an empirical analysis of the differences between trial verdicts and post-trial settlement amounts in medical malpractice cases using a database comprised of closed claims in the state of Texas in order to better understand the causes of so-called "haircuts" -the difference between post-trial settlements underlying trial verdicts in cases in which the settlement amount is lower. 105 Hyman, et al. determined that haircuts are common in medical malpractice cases: 75 percent of cases in which a trial verdict was rendered were settled for some amount below that verdict (adjusted for pre-trial and post-trial interest). 106 Another 20 percent of these cases were settled for an amount at or near the amount of the verdict, and 5 percent of plaintiffs received settlements that were higher than their verdict at trial.
107
Hyman et al. observe that haircuts are explained in part by the always-present possibility that a trial verdict will be reversed on appeal.
108 Verdicts in weaker cases would receive larger haircuts than others to the extent that this factor influences post-trial settlement negotiations, but no independent measure of case strength is available for Hyman et al. to use in order to measure this effect. Instead, they focus on the frequency with which haircuts coexist with factors including judicial reductions in trial verdicts (either remittitur or JNOV), punitive damages caps, special caps on damages in wrongful death suits, and a verdict that exceeds the limits on a defendant's liability insurance policy. 105 See Haircuts, supra note ___. 106 Haircuts, supra note ___ at 5-6. 107 Id.
108 Haircuts, supra note ___ at 52. 109 Haircuts, supra note ___ at 34-47. 110 Haircuts, supra note ___ at 4.
verdicts increases more sharply for cases with above-limits verdicts than it does for cases with below-limits verdicts. 111 They also note that 31 percent of cases in which abovelimits verdicts were handed down settle after trial for an amount within 5 percent of the applicable policy limits, creating a visible spike in the distribution of post-trial settlement amounts.
However, some of Hyman et al.'s other findings cast doubt on their conclusion that policy limits, though clearly a settlement magnet for some reason, "effectively cap recovery," 112 either because of the great difficulty involved in collecting the excess judgment amount from a physician's personal assets 113 or due to a civilized decision by plaintiffs lawyers to avoid seeking "blood money."
114 Most notably, Hyman et al. found that 47 percent of all cases involving trial verdicts in excess of policy limits were settled for amounts that also exceeded policy limits. 115 In nearly half of all excess-verdict cases, then, collectability concerns were not overriding enough to convince plaintiffs to settle for an amount equal to the policy limits. Moreover, insurers, rather than physicians, usually agreed to pay the portion of the settlement exceeding the contractual limits of the policy. As Hyman et al. note, the frequency with which insurers voluntarily pay judgment amounts that exceed their contractual liability suggests that, in some cases, insurers are effectively settling future Stowers claims in the form of voluntary over-limits settlement payments. 116 Zeiler et al., also using the Texas Closed Claims Database, examine the insurance limits and malpractice payments of paid claims that closed in 1990-2003. 98.5 percent of claims were settled within policy limits, and 16 percent of claims were between 95 percent and 100 percent of policy limits, with most of those at policy limits. 117 The "spike" at limits increases as policy size falls. Zeiler et al. finds that real insurance limits are declining over time. In 2003 dollars, primary carriers paid $2.4 billion at or below limits, while $121.1 million was paid above limits by primary and excess carriers as well as the insured doctors, who contributed just $11.8 million to that total, and even then, in just a few cases per year. 118 Zeiler et al. concludes, "Even patients with strong claims, 111 Haircuts, supra note ___ at 40-1. 112 Haircuts, supra note ___ at 53. 113 Ibid. 114 Haircuts, supra note ___ at 39. 115 Haircuts, supra note ___ at 42. 116 Haircuts, supra note ___ at 55. 117 Zeiler, supra note __ at s10. 
121
Writing separately at the Tort Deform blog in a post titled "'A Lot Off the Top': Jury Verdict Haircuts," Charles Silver draws further conclusions from the findings in Haircuts. 122 Observing that "the biggest [trial] verdicts go to the people whose injuries are the worst," he argues that "the tort system requires the neediest patients to give up the most" in the form of a post-trial haircut. 123 Silver mentions three causes of haircuts: statutory caps, judicial review for excessiveness, and the amount of liability coverage possessed by the defendant, the last of which is the most significant of the three. He concludes by suggesting that doctors be required to purchase higher-limit liability insurance policies in order to combat the perceived problem of policy limits effectively capping damages.
A month later, Silver offered some additional analysis of the research in Haircuts in a blog post titled "How Much Malpractice Coverage Does Your Doctor Have?" in which he bluntly concluded that "as a practical matter, payments are capped at the limits of doctors' insurance policies."
124 Silver cites the spike in settlements that occur at policy limits as evidence that insurance policies cap recoveries even when patients deserve much more. 125 Silver argues that "state laws, trusts, limited partnerships, and other devices" insulate physicians' assets and make it impractical to pursue recoveries from the personal assets of medical malpractice defendants. 126 Silver concludes that doctors'
119 Id. at s41.
120 Id. at s40.
121 Silver, supra note __. assets are so well protected that statutory caps on damages are completely irrelevant: "If people in our society focused on things that mattered, the debate over damages caps would end immediately. We already have them."
III. The Model

A. Basic Framework
We begin with the simplest possible model. Assume one plaintiff, one defendant, fixed damages D and fixed noneconomic damages N, probability of winning at trial p, and insurance limits L. In such a model the expected judgment E(J) is equal to p(D+N).
E(J) = p × (D+N)
The variable p serves as an approximation of the merit of the case, as judged by a factfinder. In this world of perfect information, no one ever goes to trial, and risk-neutral parties will quickly reach settlement Y
Strong cases settle for more than weak ones-indeed, the settlement amount reflects the strength of the case.
If there is a cap of non-economic damages at N*<N, then
Y = E(J) = p × (D+N*)
and the bulk of the effect falls upon those with strong cases with high p:
Figure 3
The question becomes what happens when E(J) > L. The Texas studies found a cluster of settlements at or near L. The Texas studies suggest that there are polite reasons not to seek more than L, 127 and Silver suggests that all settlements at insurance limits reflect highly meritorious claims. 128 Silver's hypothesis is reflected in Figure 4 , in which a kink on the graph where Y = L reflects under-compensation for those with the strongest cases. 127 Silver, supra note _ at 189; 128 "How Much Malpractice Coverage Does Your Doctor Have?" supra note __.
Figure 4
Silver, et al. suggests that there are polite reasons not to seek more than L.
129 But this hypothesis contradicts both what we know about the incentives of attorneys and the empirical data. Are we to believe that trial lawyers, out of the goodness of their heart, refuse to seek more than L?
130 This seems improbable: the insured doctor is likely to have substantial assets, trusts provide limited protection, 131 and the plaintiff attorney's fiduciary duty to her client requires her to zealously pursue the doctor's assets. 132 It is more likely that insurance companies aggressively pursue settlement after an above-limits verdict. In Campbell, for example, the mere threat of execution on a judgment resulted in $11 million in additional liability for an underlying claim a tiny fraction of that size.
Even a risk-averse plaintiff would be motivated to seek a settlement between E(J) and L. But then we need an explanation of why it is that so many cases do settle at exactly or just under L.
Moreover, the observed data in the Texas studies shows many settlements for amounts greater than insurance limits. The Texas studies' hypothesis that insurance limits are a de facto cap cannot explain these settlements, and there is also no evidence in the database to support an inference that all settlements at L reflect judgment-proof defendants.
For the model to be consistent with the empirical data, it must generate both a cluster of settlements at L as well as a significant number of settlements greater than L. Our basic framework model is too simple, and fails one or both tests.
We believe that something is missing from this model, and that what is missing is a full recognition of the effect of Stowers in the analysis.
B. Frank-Gryphon Model
We now add two factors to the basic framework that we previously introduced. First, we add an error measure ε to each of the parties' assessment of the likelihood of success at trial. As others have demonstrated, an error term is a necessary component of a model where some cases settle and other cases go to trial; trials occur when the parties are too optimistic relative to one another.
Next, we add a Stowers factor S, which is equal to expected Stowers recovery given a victory at the underlying medical malpractice trial.
Finally, we create a game theory model around these additional factors. First, the plaintiff decides whether to bring a case. We assume the plaintiff will only bring a case if p p > 0. At the next stage of the game, the plaintiff makes an offer O p to the insurance company. The offer takes into account the possible expected value of a Stowers award if the case goes to trial. But the plaintiff must also take into account the fact that if its offer is not within insurance limits, then S = 0.
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Function f is discontinuous; so long as S is large enough, the plaintiff is always going to 
C. Monte Carlo Simulation
A Monte Carlo simulation "is a statistical technique that uses randomly generated inputs from probability distributions to model a real-world process." 137 We programmed a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet 138 to do a Monte Carlo simulation of 1000 "games" for individual levels of p to see what the average recovery is for each level of p to test our hypothesis. In each game, we generated two random values of ε, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.155. In successful tests of robustness, we also varied the fixed values of D, N, and S, (and the standard deviation of ε); we also ran robust Monte Carlo simulations relaxing some of the game rules regarding which party makes the first settlement offer without change to our findings. D + N) ) was below insurance limits. Moreover, there were cases in which the defendant was overly optimistic and faced a judgment above insurance limits. There were also cases in which the plaintiff was too pessimistic and failed to bring a case that had actual value. (This is an artifact of the game model, and changing the game so that an aggressive plaintiff still brings a case that it believes to be valueless and seeks to settle where the defendant's valuation of the case is greater than zero does not affect our conclusions. Such an aggressive plaintiff will recover more, but we recognize that that is solely an artifact of the model, and we do not have empirical qualitative data to show that it is profitable to bring a case that the plaintiff believes to be valueless. 141 ) Most surprisingly, we found that the expected value E(V) for plaintiffs had the following characteristic:
Figure 10
Perversely, so long as there is a chance of recovery via Stowers, plaintiffs bringing suit with lower-merit cases would outperform plaintiffs with higher-merit cases, holding all other values constant. Plaintiffs in higher-merit cases would still offer an undercompensating settlement at insurance limits to preserve the possibility of a Stowers judgment, which the defendants would gladly agree to. But the lower-merit cases have the possibility of settlement negotiations falling through because of an overly optimistic valuation by the insurer, followed by the possibility of recovering both an above-limits judgment and Stowers claim. This feature was robust for a variety of values of D + N > L and S.
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Notably, this contradicts the claim often made by trial lawyers that the contingent fee system deters bringing low-merit suits. 143 Rather, when damages are likely to exceed insurance limits if awarded, the malpractice world more closely resembles trial-lawyer Mark Lanier's description of mass tort litigation: a lawyer need only win one suit out of three. 144 In fact, a malpractice lawyer in a Stowers jurisdiction will, under some circumstances, do better litigating cases with a one-in-three chance of success than litigating higher merit cases with similar expected values. Introducing Stowers liability into the model causes the payoffs associated with low-merit claims to increase dramatically. A low-merit case with only a ten percent chance of recovering $3 million in damages at trial is now worth more than double the expected $300,000 because of the possibility of a settlement breakdown, success at trial, followed by Stowers recovery.
Figure 11
At the lowest values of p, E(V) increases much faster than p × (D + N), overcompensating such plaintiffs, reaching a maxima at p*, and then either asymptotically approaching or actually reaching L, as p increased above p*, often undercompensating the high-p plaintiffs. Settlements at L were not uncommon for low-merit cases.
We next run a simulation in which we cap N at $250,000, but hold Stowers liability constant. The line of triangles in Figure 11 represents the results of this simulation. As readers can see, capping N results in a wealth-transfer from plaintiffs to doctors/insurers, but (1) the entire burden falls on plaintiffs with low-p cases; (2) plaintiffs with medium-p cases counter-intuitively do slightly better with the damages cap; and (3) plaintiffs with low-p cases remain overcompensated relative to the expected value of their cases in the absence of Stowers while plaintiffs with high-p cases remain undercompensated. This result remains robust varying N while keeping a variety of values of D and S fixed.
To the extent one believes that p-the probability of success before a jury-correlates with the underlying merit of a case, noneconomic damages caps have their greatest effect on low-merit cases.
D. Limitations of the Model
This is still a relatively simple model: it assumes instantaneous and frictionless rulings, rather than an expensive process that may take several years with substantial fees for attorneys and medical expert witnesses. We assume that the trial court's judgment is 100% accurate, and that there will be no appeal. We therefore do not consider the issue of post-trial settlement. In real life, the risk that a favorable judgment will be struck on appeal one reason why so many large judgments are settled so seemingly favorably, but it is impossible to estimate the size of this effect without qualitative data that the Hyman "haircut" study does not have.
Trials take years. We make no effort to compare the value of a settlement in the hand with a judgment several years in the future that is stayed by appeal. On the other hand,
We also assume an identity of interests between the defendant and the insurer and that the insurer's decision to settle is simultaneously the defendant's decision to settle. This is an oversimplification, but interests can diverge in both directions. Doctors may be riskaverse and demand unfavorable settlements within policy limits. 152 In the alternative, the insurer may have a more pessimistic view of the case than the doctor, and wish to settle to avoid legal expense when the doctor-defendant does not wish to settle. Such conflicts may arise in real life, where the insured is facing a deductible, 153 where the insured wishes to avoid possible reporting to national databases for malpractice settlements or other reputational effects from settling, 154 or situations where the doctor simply firmly believes in her innocence and wishes vindication. It is conceivable that an insurer might ask a defendant doctor for a contribution to the settlement, or that a risk-averse doctor would agree to put up some of her own money to encourage settlement, but Zeiler, Silver, and Syverud each note that this practice is rare.
155 This is perhaps also an artifact of Stowers, because, as Syverud suggests, "an insurer's 'insistence upon a contribution as the price of settlement' will almost certainly be considered evidence of bad faith in any subsequent action for excess liability."
We ignore the effect that attorneys' fees may have on a decision to go to trial. In a case with complex facts, the insurer may prefer to simply pay out limits rather than nearly exhaust the policy defending itself and potentially being on the hook for more than the limit. Plaintiffs' lawyers are certainly aware of that dynamic, and the aversion of an insurer to paying legal fees, and that certainly promotes settlement in most cases, including weaker ones. A future project would add the element of attorneys' fees to our model to determine how a loser-pays rule might affect the incentives of plaintiffs and defendants to bring and settle claims.
The game theory model assumes that there will be one settlement demand, capped at the insurance limits. In reality, there will often be several different demands. Impact found 84 separate instances of the final pre-trial settlement demand being higher than insurance limits.
159 Nevertheless, the Texas dataset is indeterminate on how that settlement demand arose. One possible scenario, for example, would be an at-limits settlement demand, followed by a denial by the insurer, followed by an especially bad performance at deposition by the insured doctor. In such a scenario, it is plausible for the plaintiff to make a new settlement demand above insurance limits, while still protecting their Stowers rights because of the earlier settlement offer below limits; the Texas dataset would only record the last demand.
The error rate ε was randomly generated in order to produce a number of cases in which settlement negotiations fell through; it has no empirical basis. A smaller error rate generates less dramatic curves, but the model is sufficiently robust that its observations hold. Of course, actual measurement of ε (and, in most cases, p!) is impossible.
IV. Discussion
This paper is the first to model the effect of a bad-faith refusal to settle cause of action on the pre-trial settlement negotiations in underlying medical malpractice cases and the related effects of noneconomic damages caps. Though further refinements in the model are possible, our results find that settlements at insurance limits are not always a reflection of the merits of the case. Not every settlement at insurance limits reflects a case in which the system is under-compensating a plaintiff whose underlying claim is worth more. Rather, it is entirely possible, as Chandler notes, that a settlement at insurance limits is a risk-neutral decision to settle with a party with a low-merit case.
Thus, Silver is incorrect to infer that the Texas studies necessarily reflect frequent undercompensation: without knowledge of the underlying qualitative characteristics of the case that leads to such a settlement, such as the likelihood of successful appeal, no conclusions can be drawn. The mere fact of the settlement at insurance limits is indeterminate of the quality question because the possibility of a Stowers judgment down the line increases the value of low-merit cases, as well as the long-term costs to insured physicians.
Ironically, the purpose of Stowers and other bad-faith refusal-to-settle cases is to protect insureds, but the doctrine of unintended consequences has backfired on the judges who created these rules. We can see from the model that Stowers increases the settlement value of low-merit cases, therefore causing more low-merit cases to be brought against insured physicians. Each additional low-merit case that is settled or litigated raises premium costs for insureds in the long run. Because Stowers provides a cause of action to the third-party plaintiff, Texas insureds cannot even choose to contract out of bad-faith litigation in exchange for a lower insurance rate. 160 What they can do is opt out of the insurance system entirely to avoid the deleterious effects of Stowers on the incentives of plaintiffs and insurance companies. This may be part of the reason why we see an increase in the number of hospitals that choose to self-insure. 161 We don't yet propose to do away with Stowers and its ilk entirely. The principal-agent problem in insurance cases is a real one, and it remains unclear whether it could be resolved in advance through contracting. But capping bad-faith damages at double the amount of any excess liability would reduce uncertainty and possibly reduce the wealth transfer from doctors to attorneys who bring low-merit cases.
If insurance limits acted only as a de facto cap on damages, then the effects of noneconomic damages caps would indeed be blunted, as Silver, et al. suggests. But our model indicates that the brunt of non-economic damages caps falls entirely upon parties and attorneys who are overcompensated by bringing relatively low-merit cases. This is a pleasant and counterintuitive surprise. The "fairness" argument against caps is now stood on its head, which should reduce resistance to damages caps as a vehicle for reform.
That same insurance limit, however, potentially under-compensates plaintiffs with surething cases. The Texas studies raise the possible problem of doctors deliberately underpurchasing insurance in order to discourage lawsuits. 162 We are loathe to further regulate doctors by mandating a particular level of insurance, but it would be reasonable for doctors to be required to identify how much insurance they carry so that patients and insurance companies could decide on a case-by-case basis whether they would rather have more malpractice insurance or lower medical expenses.
